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I. INTRODUCTION
Things are not always what they seem. The five sons of the Irish
king Eochaid were out hunting one day when they got lost in the forest;
they could not find their Way out and were overcome with thirst. Each
in turn set out to search for water. The first, Fergus, found a well
where an old woman was standing guard. Without going into it, suffice
it to say that she was not a pretty sight. When Fergus asked for water
the hag proposed a trade-water for a kiss on the cheek. Fergus refused,
telling her he would rather die from thirst than kiss her. He went away
thirsty. Three other brothers, Olioll, Brian, and Fiachra, followed, and,
like Fergus, they refused the woman's terms of exchange.
Last came Niall, who, when presented with the hag's terms not only
gave her a kiss but also a hug. When Niall looked at the woman again,
the old lady had become the most beautiful woman in the world. She
was, in fact, Royal Rule,' and what had originally appeared to be a
foul, old witch was in actuality the equivalent of a goddess. As Niall
and his brothers learned, appearances, or impressions, can be deceiving.
Often we have to take a close look at something to see what it is we
are really looking at. The same is true of strict liability.
Some hear the words strict liability and quiver. What is this thing?
Does it hold everyone liable for everything? Will it shut down industry?
Will it grind the wheels of commerce to a halt? Do we shy away from
it as did the brothers from the hag? Like Niall's brothers do we draw
our conclusions too quickly? Upon closer examination, strict liability,
as courts apply it, is not what we may first assume. It may not be
Royal Rule. In fact, it may not be a strange, new thing at all. Strict
liability might remind us of that familiar old concept-negligence.
In many states, including Louisiana, manufacturers are supposedly
"strictly" liable, at least in some cases, when their unreasonably dan-
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gerous products cause injury.2 Similarly, in Louisiana one is strictly
liable if a thing in her "garde" presents an unreasonable risk of harm
which causes injury to another.' Far from being liability across the board
for making a product or having a thing, however, strict liability, as
courts use the phrase, is merely truncated negligence involving a com-
parable, but slightly simplified, analysis. Many courts have adopted the
notion that strict liability is akin to negligence but with a presumption
of knowledge of the risk.4 Thus, strict liability, like negligence, involves
a risk utility balance but without the cost of knowledge added in. It
involves a shortened version of the Learned Hand formula, subtracting
2. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, and D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts
§§ 97 & 98 (5th ed. 1984) Ihereinafter Prosser & Keeton].
3. La. Civ. Code art. 2317; Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983); Kent
v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441
(La. 1975).
4. In the products liability context, see Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J.
429, 451, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (1984); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485,
492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974). As to strict liability under La. Civ. Code art. 2317 see
Kent, 418 So. 2d at 497.
The California Supreme Court has recently held that state of the art evidence is admissible
in a strict products liability failure to warn case. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991). The court indicated
that the relevancy of the manufacturer's knowledge (compliance with state of the art) did
not turn strict liability into negligence. This proposition is contrary to much of what I
say herein. Perhaps in my own defense, I must point out that the California Supreme
Court's position on this point is ambiguous. First, the court pointed out that negligent
failure to warn depends upon the manufacturer's failure to conform to the appropriate
standard of care, whereas strict liability, per the court, does not (supposedly) involve a
breach of the standard of care. The plaintiff need only prove that the "defendant did
not adequately warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the
generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the
time of manufacture and distribution." Id. at 1002, 810 P.2d at 558, 281 CLI. Rptr. at
537. It seems to me the quoted portion gets right back into a standard of care and
negligence. The court, continuing, said that a manufacturer could escape negligence liability
for failing to warn if its own testing showed a result "contrary to that of others ......
Id. at 1003, 810 P.2d at 559, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 538. Such a manufacturer might not
escape strict liability because it must provide a warning of what was known. But, if the
manufacturer's research was correct, why would the product be unreasonably dangerous?
If it were incorrect, might it not be negligent? If it were reasonably incorrect, how many
cases are we really talking about? I feel the California court is drawing lines in the sand.
Making state of the art admissible/determinative eviscerates the negligence/strict liability
distinction..
I have a final nit to pick. The Anderson court cites Louisiana as a jurisdiction where
state of the art evidence was not admissible in a warning case. Id. at 997 n.10, 810 P.2d
at 554 n.10, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 533 n.10, and refers to Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986). While Halphen held state of the art was inadmissible
in an unreasonably dangerous per se case, the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically allowed
for the admissability of state of the art evidence in a warning case. Id. at 114-15.
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the burden of discovering the risk.- One is negligent, per the Hand
formula, when B < P x L. B is the burden of avoiding the risk; P is
the ex ante probability the risk will materialize in injury; and, L is the
gravity of the risk if it materializes in injury. Adjusting the Hand
formula, someone is strictly liable if B - BK < P x L, where BK is
the burden of knowing or discovering the relevant risk. 6 As such, strict
liability is a lot like negligence.
Identifying something as strict liability, the first step, is not the
same, however, as explaining it, the second step. Why do we have strict
liability, or what I call strict liability in action? Why did we get to
where we are? What explains it? What is there to support such a
truncated negligence formula? What is behind this concept of strict
liability in action? This is a paper about both steps. What do we have,
and, why do we have it? The pages that follow explore these questions.
In section II, I describe what I call strict liability in action, distin-
guishing it from some other uses of the phrase. In section III, I discuss
what potential justifications there are for the presumption of knowledge
in strict liability cases. Section IV reassesses strict liability in action in
light of the possible justifications; and, section V sets forth some brief
conclusionary remarks.
II. DEFININO TERMS
The phrase strict liability is susceptible of several meanings. As a
result, it is essential at the outset to define the phrase as I use it in
this article. Of course, in presenting my definition I exclude others. I
do not mean to imply that these other definitions are unacceptable or
somehow spurious. Rather, they are available alternatives which I merely
distinguish for present purposes.
A. Strict Liability In Action
I use the phrase strict liability to refer to, if I might paraphrase
the legal realists, strict liability in action, not strict liability in theory.'
Strict liability in action, like negligence, involves a balance at the case-
specific level of risk and utility.' To be strictly liable there must be an
unreasonable risk of harm. 9
5. See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
6. Id.
7. For a definition of strict liability in theory, see infra text accompanying notes
45-50.
8. Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-293 (1965). The Restatement,
in sections 291-293. expressly uses the terms risk and utility. Interestingly, the Restatement
states that in a negligence case the risk/utility balance is conducted only "[wihere an act
1991]
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Nationally, no doubt the most controversial, publicized, and wide-
spread interest in strict liability is in the supposedly strict liability of a
product manufacturer for defects in its products. Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 402A provides:
(1) One who-sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought
the product from or entered into any contractual relation with
the seller.' 0
One notes immediately that the manufacturer or seller is only liable
if the product is in an "unreasonably dangerous" condition. The phrase
unreasonably dangerous often reminds lawyers and students of negli-
gence. Recall that one is liable in negligence only if she knew or should
have known of a risk and proceeded to act unreasonably in light of
that risk." Courts have wrestled with giving meaning to the phrase
unreasonably dangerous in the products liability field. Some have adopted
a consumer expectation test, citing the comments to the Restatement."
Under this test, a manufacturer is strictly liable for its product if the
product is dangerous to an extent beyond that contemplated by the
ordinary user.' 3 Others courts have leaned away from the consumer
expectation test and towards a risk/utility test. 4 Under such a test the
decision maker balances the risks the product presents against its utility
is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another."
Thus, the risk/utility balance is done after it is determined that the defendant knew or
should have known of the risk of harm presented. But, under both the Restatement and
Judge Learned Hand's negligence formulae the process is basically the same. Courts and
juries balance the benefits and risk of the conduct (or the way in which the conduct was
engaged) of the defendant and others like him or her.
9. For a definition of strict liability in theory see infra text accompanying notes 45
through 50.
10. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
!1. See, e.g., supra note 8. See also Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 31, at 170.
12. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965). For a discussion of
the consumer expectation test see Prosser and Keeton, supra note 2, § 99, at 698-99.
13. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 2, § 99, at 698.
14. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-293 (1965).
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as manufactured, designed, or sold. The risk/utility test used in products
liability litigation is akin to the balancing test courts use when deter-
mining whether or not a defendant -is negligent." The similarity is in
the risk/utility balance; the difference is found in the factor of the
defendant's knowledge. Before discussing that difference, however, let
us turn to Louisiana.
In Louisiana, under Civil Code article 2317, the custodian of a
thing is strictly liable for the damages that the thing causes.' 6 In order
to prevail in an Article 2317 case, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant had "garde" of the thing,' 7 that the thing was unreasonably
dangerous," and that its unreasonably dangerous condition caused in-
jury. 19 In determining whether or not the thing was unreasonably dan-
gerous, Louisiana courts frequently employ a risk/utility test. 20 Once
again, the test is reminiscent of the risk/utility test employed in negligence
cases, but lack of knowledge of the defect is not a defense."'
15. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 834-38 (1973).
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. The Louisiana Civil Code actually provides that one who has "custody" of a
thing is liable for the damages it causes; however, courts have noted that the word custody
does not adequately translate the French word "garde," the original word used in earlier
editions of the Civil Code. See, e.g., Ross v. La Coste de Monterville, 502 So. 2d 1026
(La. 1987); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 447 (La. 1975). For a recent discussion
of garde, see Doughty v. Lloyds Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 461 (La. 1991). See also Socorro
v. City of New Orleans, 579 So. 2d 931 (La. 1991).
18. See, e.g., Spivey v. Super Valu, 575 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983) and Kent v. Gulf States
Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
21. For purposes of this article I am focusing only on Louisiana Civil Code article
2317 and generally on products liability. Article 2317 is the introductory article to a series
of articles which Louisiana courts have interpreted as imposing strict liability on various
other persons who have a certain relationship with various persons or things. Almost
everything that is said relating to Article 2317 also applies to Article 2322. Article 2322
imposes strict liability on a building owner for injuries arising out of the ruin of the
building caused by a vice in the original construction or a neglect to repair. Courts
basically state that building owners are strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous char-
acteristics of their buildings which cause injury. Recently, when there has been doubt
regarding whether or not there was a ruin or whether or not whatever it was that caused
the plaintiff's injury was a part of defendant's building, courts have resorted to Article
2317 as a basis of liability rather than Article 2322. See Fonseca v. Marlin Marine Corp.,
410 So. 2d 674 (La. 1981). Arguably broader liability is imposed by Article 2322, as any
owner is liable, even one who does not have garde of the building. Both Article 2317
and Article 2322 create the same type of strict liability. Knowledge of the risk is basically
presumed (or lack of knowledge is not a defense) and the court proceeds from there.
The knowledge issue is not as neatly presented in the other strict liability articles but it
might still be said that knowledge is essentially irrelevant.
For instance, Louisiana Civil Code article 2318 imposes liability upon parents for certain
19911
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Consequently, one might say that in strict liability cases, courts
presume that the defendant has knowledge of the dangerous characteristic
of its product or thing and then ask whether or not a defendant with
knowledge of the dangerous characteristic of the thing or product would
use, keep, or sell it in that condition.2 2 If the person who had knowledge
would be negligent (or unreasonable) for using, keeping or selling a
thing or product in its injury-causing condition, then the product or
thing presents an unreasonable risk of harm and the defendant is liable-
strictly liable.3
torts which their children commit while residing with them. If the child is over the age
of discernment and commits a tort, then the parent is vicariously liable. If the child is
below the age of discernment but engages in conduct which would be a tort under normal
standards, the parents are strictly liable. See Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
(Query what happens when the child is over the age of discernment and engages in conduct
which would not be a tort for a child of his age, intelligence, and experience but would
be a tort for an adult? Are the parents strictly liable?) Turning to the knowledge issue,
one might conclude that what would prevent a child from having the ability to discern
whether his actions were negligent is his "knowledge of the world." That is, the child
lacks the capacity to know that what he is doing is wrong. In essence, capacity is related
to knowledge. Thus, by denying the parents the defense that the child had no capacity,
the court is essentially holding them strictly liable. Indeed, in his concurrence in Kent,
Justice Dennis stated: "In negligence, allowance is made for the risk apparent to the
actor, for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under which he must act.
In strict liability, however, knowledge of the condition of the product is imputed to the
defendant before the balancing test or negligence test is applied." 418 So. 2d at 501
(Dennis, J., concurring).
Louisiana Civil Code article 2319 involves liability for custodians of interdicted persons.
Once again, these persons arguably lack the capacity to know right from wrong, so what
was said regarding children is equally applicable to them.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, amongst other things, imposes vicarious liability upon
employers for torts which their employees commit in the course and scope of employment.
Although the relationship between a presumption of knowledge and vicarious liability is
interesting and raises several theoretical questions, these need not detain us now. Suffice
it to say that the employer's lack of knowledge that the employee committed a tort is
irrelevant to determining vicarious liability for that tort.
Finally, Louisiana Civil Code article 2321 imposes liability upon the owner of an animal
for injury which it causes to others. In Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974),
the supreme court held that Louisiana did not follow the "first bite rule" and that the
defendant's failure to know that its dog might bite someone was not a defense. Thus,
lack of knowledge was no defense. In Boyer v. Seal, 553 So. 2d 827 (La. 1989), the
court held that owners of domestic animals are liable when their animals create an
unreasonable risk of harm which causes injury to another. Further, it has been held that
owners of wild animals are absolutely liable. See Holland, 305 So. 2d at 119 n.10.
Although I am focusing only on Article 2317 because of its prevalence and because of
the clarity with which the presumption of knowledge issue is presented in the cases, one
can see that knowledge is what separates strict liability in Louisiana from negligence.
22. See generally Kent, 418 So. 2d 493, and Wade, supra note 15.
23. See Wade, supra note 15.
[Vol. 52
STRICT LIABILITY IN ACTION
Both Dean Page Keeton 4 and Dean John Wade2l have articulated
this presumed knowledge test as a way to determine whether a product
manufacturer is strictly liable. In his majority opinion in Kent v. Gulf
States Utilities Co.,16 Justice Lemmon of the Louisiana Supreme Court
posited this same formula for determining strict liability under Article
2317. Other Louisiana courts have adopted the same idea although they
approach it a little differently. They note that the risk/utility test in a
strict liability case is essentially the same as it is in a negligence case
except that the defendant's knowledge or lack thereof is not a defense. 2"
These courts do not refer to a presumption of knowledge and do not
focus on whether a defendant who had knowledge would be negligent.
Instead, they note that lack of knowledge is no defense and balance
the risk and utility of the thing.
Although there seems to me to be no real difference between the
two approaches, I prefer Justice Lemmon's articulation because it en-
courages the decision maker to look not only at the thing involved but
also at what the guardian has done to render the thing less risky,
whether she knew of the risk or not. For instance, imagine a rotten
step of which the owner/custodian is not aware. A visitor falls through
the step. If there had been a sign stating: DO NOT GO UP THESE
STAIRS, the sign would reduce the risk side of the calculus even though
the owner has no idea the stair is rotten. Lemmon's formulation'clearly
assures that the sign is figured into the balance. The other approach
does not expressly exclude the sign; however, it is not as clearly a
relevant concern. Lemmon's approach reminds us that strict liability is
negligence without knowledge. The other approach is somewhat more
vague for the trier of fact and the practicing attorney. Importantly, the
effect of both formulations is the same-knowledge of the risk is not
an issue.
Turning now from the two formulations of strict liability to a
comparison of negligence and strict liability, despite the similarities be-
tween strict liability in action and negligence, they are not the same
thing."8 They are not because, as noted, knowledge of the risk is irrelevant
in a strict liability case. However, the two are quite similar, because
both negligence and strict liability involve a case specific risk/utility
balance. Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted this similarity in
24. See, e.g., Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's
L.J. 30 (1973).
25. See Wade, supra note 15.
26. 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
27. See, e.g., Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983) and Spivey v. Super
Valu, 575 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
28. See Entrevia, 427 So. 2d 1146; Keeton, supra note 24, at 33-35; and Wade, supra
note 15, at 834-88.
1991]
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an Article 2317 case. In Oster v. Department of Transportation and
Development, State of Louisiana,2 9 Justice Cole wrote:
In essence, the only difference between the negligence theory of
recovery and the strict liability theory of recovery is that the
plaintiff need not prove the defendant was aware of the existence
of the "defect" under a strict liability theory. Under the neg-
ligence theory, it is the defendant's awareness of the dangerous
condition of the property that gives rise to a duty to act. Under
a strict liability theory, it is the defendant's legal relationship
with the property containing a defect that gives rise to the duty.
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441, 446 (La. 1976). Under both
theories, the absence of an unreasonably dangerous condition
of the thing implies the absence of a duty on the part of the
defendant.
Cole continued at footnote four in Oster:
4. La. R.S. 9:2800(B) provides that in an action against a "public
entity" under La. C.C. article 2317, the plaintiff must prove
the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the defect
in the thing before liability will attach. This statute appears to
eviscerate the distinction between negligence and strict liability
when a public entity is a defendant.30
All I can say in light of the Oster quote is "I agree."'"
1. Negligence
It is now appropriate to compare strict liability, as described above,
with liability for negligence from a theoretical approach. As noted, one
might say that a person is negligent when she knew or should have
known of a risk and failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the
risk.32 Thus, negligence can occur through action or failure to act, in
light of some known or reasonably knowable risk.3 Consequently, one
could break negligence down into two elements: knowledge and risk
29. 582 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1991).
30. Id. at 1288 (part of footnote 4 is omitted).
31. In Labit v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 581 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
the court considered another case against the state. The plaintiff had alleged both negligence
under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and strict liability under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2317. La. R.S. 9:2800 (1991) applied to the case. Noting that the state had actual
knowledge of the alleged defect, the court stated: "Therefore, the liability analysis is the
same under La. C.C. art. 2315 or La. C.C. art. 2317." 581 So. 2d at 734. The quoted
sentence is consistent with my understanding of strict liability in action.
32. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
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prevention. Negligence fundamentally differs from strict liability in that
knowledge is not an element of the plaintiff's strict liability case.
Judge Learned Hand provided an algebraic or economic definition
of negligence in a series of cases decided in the 1940's.3 4 His formulation
merits consideration now. According to Judge Hand, an actor was
negligent when the burden of avoiding an accident (B) was less than
the ex ante (before hand) probability of an accident occurring times the
anticipated severity of the accident if it occurred (P x L). The product
of P times L represents the ex ante cost of the accident. Thus, if B is
less then P x L the defendant who fails to undertake that burden (B)
is negligent." As such, Hand's formula encourages actors to behave
efficiently by spending up to but not over the ex ante "cost" of the
accident. Phrased differently, society wants an actor to spend $99 (B)
to avoid a $100 accident (P x L); she is negligent if she fails to do so.
Alternatively, society does not want her to spend $101 to avoid that
same accident. So if B is $101 and P x L is still $100, letting the
accident happen and leaving the loss on the victim is good for society,
at least if it is societas economicus.
For present purposes, it is important to focus on the B side of the
formula. The burden of avoiding an accident is not simply the direct
cost of accident avoidance. B should encompass all the costs involved
in accident avoidance.16 For instance, if a safety feature on a product
would avoid an accident, the direct cost (labor and materials) of placing
the guard on the product would be included in B. Likewise, if the
product has a lower utility with the guard than it does without the
guard, the reduced utility is also part of B. 7 Most importantly for
present purposes, B also includes the "cost" of discovering the risk
associated with the product, thing, or activity.3 This would include all
the costs of researching the risk. These costs are implicit in Hand's
formula.
34. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway
v. O'Brien, II1 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492, 61 S.
Ct. 634 (1941).
35. See Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
36. If B does not encompass all the costs involved in avoiding an accident then the
actor is not actually taking into account all of the costs which its conduct imposes upon
society. As such, the actor will over-engage in the activity, exposing people to undue
levels of risk.
37. See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, supra note 2, § 99, at 700. Note also that the
Louisiana Products Liability Act expressly provides that in a design case, the court, as
part of the risk/utility balance, must consider the impaired utility on the defendant's
products of an alternative design. La. R.S. 9:2800.56(2) (1991).
38. Including the cost of discovering a risk in B is essential to the smooth application
of the Learned Hand test. If the Learned Hand test is only applied after knowledge is
gained, then the test would ignore the cost of discovery. The cost of discovering a risk
is an important part of the risk/utility balance.
19911
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Interestingly, several recent Louisiana Supreme Court cases have
employed Hand's formula. In one, Levi v. SLEMCO, 9 the formula is
extensively discussed; however, the court applies the test after deciding
if the defendant electrical cooperative had knowledge of the risk.4 Thus,
the court separates the knowledge issue from the Hand balance. This
is certainly acceptable but it is not necessary. Hand did not do so
although he did not specifically focus on knowledge. Further, in Dobson
v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.,41 Justice Dennis, writing for the
majority, stated that Louisiana courts might employ Hand's formula to
compare fault in comparative negligence cases. In so doing the court
allocated less fault to an inexperienced tree trimmer electrocuted by an
uninsulated electric utility's distribution line than to the utility because
it would have cost the decedent more to discover the risk. Thus in
Dobson, the court implicitly recognized that the knowledge issue in a
negligence case can be subsumed into Hand's formula.
2. Strict Liability and the Presumption of Knowledge
As noted, the primary difference between strict liability in action
and negligence is that in a strict liability case knowledge of the risk is
presumed. Thus, lack of knowledge of the risk is not a defense. From
an economic perspective one is negligent if B < P x L. Employing the
same variables to define strict liability, one is strictly liable if B - BK
< P x L where BK is the burden of obtaining knowledge of the risk.
39. 542 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1989).
40. In the opinion the court has a section titled "Whether the power company was
required to recognize the hazard" which precedes a section titled "Whether the hazard
was an unreasonable risk of harm." It is in the second section that the court addresses
the Learned Hand test. In essence, by using the test only to determine whether or not
the defendant's conduct presented an unreasonable risk of harm, the court is using it to
determine the breach issue in the negligence formula. That is, if negligence consists of
four factors, duty, breach of a duty, cause, and damage, one might say that the court
in Levi was using the Learned Hand formula to determine breach. Knowledge would
relate to duty, and one could say that once one had, or should have had, knowledge of
a risk then a duty was triggered to exercise reasonable care. Or, perhaps duty is broader.
One always has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid risk, and part of that duty
involves determining whether or not there is an unreasonable risk of harm under the
circumstances to trigger a more particularized subduty. Furthermore, by using the Learned
Hand formula only to determine breach after determining if the defendant knew or should
have known of the risk, the court is essentially doing what it does in a strict liability
case in which knowledge is not an issue. The only difference would be that in Levi, the
court, because it was deciding a negligence case, first had to determine whether or not
the defendant knew or should have known of the risk of harm. Obviously, the cost of
knowledge is relevant. See supra note 36. As such, in most negligence cases we do not
impose an absolute duty to discover a risk.
41. 567 So. 2d 569 (La. 1990).
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BK is not included; it is subtracted from B. This strict liability formula
is a truncated Learned Hand formula. An example or two may help to
explain the truncated Hand formula.
Let us begin with an example from the products liability arena.
Imagine that an auto manufacturer manufactures a car which leaves the
assembly line with an important part missing. This missing part renders
the car's brakes dangerous; because of the missing part, the brakes may
not work. Imagine that the part and labor would cost one dollar.
Furthermore, imagine that the probability of an accident occurring when
the part is not in the car is 250o and that the anticipated losses that
will be sustained if the part is not in the car are $100,000. Thus, P x
L is $25,000. Finally, imagine that in order to determine whether or
not the part is missing in any particular car that comes off the assembly
line the car manufacturer would have to expend an additional $500,000
in equipment and wages (to test for the missing part), resulting in lower
overall output. As a result, the total burden of avoidance is $500,001,
$1 for the part and $500,000 for "discovery" costs. B, $500,001, is
greater than P x L, $25,000; therefore, under the Hand negligence
formula the car manufacturer is not negligent for not discovering and
fixing the car with the missing part. On the other hand, the burden of
knowledge, the burden of discovering that the part is missing from the
machine, is not figured into the formula in a strict liability case. Using
the truncated Hand formula, B - BK < P x L, the left side of the
equation, B ($500,001) - BK ($500,000), yields $1. $1 is less than $25,000,
still the relevant figure on the right side. That is, where knowledge of
the risk is presumed, the manufacturer of the automobile is strictly
liable because B - BK < P x L, even though the manufacturer is not
negligent because B > P x L.
Turning to Louisiana and Article 2317, imagine that Driver (the
purchaser) of that unreasonably dangerous car has a wreck because the
brakes fail, and a pedestrian, Walker, is injured. Granted, under Louis-
iana law42 and in most states43 Walker can recover in a products liability
suit from the manufacturer because the courts will find the manufacturer
strictly liable because B - BK < P x L. But, in Louisiana, is Driver
strictly liable to Walker under Article 2317?
Suppose that repairing the brakes would cost purchaser $500 in
mechanic's fees and $700 in "lost utility" from "down" time while the
brakes are repaired. Further, assume the manufacturer now sells a brake
42. La. R.S. 9:2800.53(4) (1991). "Claimant" is basically defined as anyone asserting
a claim. Thus, privity of contract is not required and Walker could recover.
43. See generally Prosser & Keeton, supra note 2, at § 100. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts expressly takes no position on whether or not bystanders can recover. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A comments I and o (1965).
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defect discovery system which is available to Drivers for $24,000. Let
us keep P x L as it was in the previous hypothetical at $25,000. Note
first that the cost of the brake discovery machine is the cost of obtaining
knowledge. Like the repair cost and the "lost utility," it is part of the
burden of avoiding the accident. Second, observe that under the Hand
formula Driver is not negligent, for B ($500 + $700 + $24,000 =
$25,200) is greater than P x L ($25,000). However, Driver is strictly
liable to Walker under the truncated Learned Hand strict liability test
because B ($25,200) - BK (24,000) equals $1,200 which is less than P
x L ($25,000).
Returning once again to the linguistic statement of the negligence
formula, one will recall that it had two components- knowledge and
risk prevention." In a strict liability case, the knowledge aspect of the
linguistic negligence formula is irrelevant; however, risk prevention is
still quite relevant. Thus, the care that a manufacturer, or the custodian
of a thing, might exercise to prevent an accident is relevant in determining
whether or not a product or thing presents. an unreasonable risk of
harm.
Now, what caused us to adopt this definition of strict liability; more
simply, why do we have what we have? Before answering these questions
I must first distinguish other definitions of strict liability.
B. Calabresi Strict Liability
There has been an ongoing debate in the law and economics literature
over the efficiency of systems imposing strict liability for certain activities
as opposed to systems imposing liability only for negligence.4 5 The legal
economists who use the phrase strict liability use it to mean liability
without regard to the defendant's negligence or blameworthiness.4 Under
this definition a person may be liable despite the fact that the relevant
utility of an action, product, or thing might outweigh the risk it pre-
sented.4 7 Thus, a decision maker deciding whether to impose this type
44. See supra text accompanying note 32.
45. Compare G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1970) (hereinafter Calabresi] and
Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Leg. Stud. 205 (1973). 1 must note that in the
summer of 1990 1 had the opportunity to teach a comparative tort law class at LSU's
summer program in Aix-En-Provence, France. After spending three of the six weeks
comparing the various tort schemes of several nations, we then turned to a theoretical
examination of the general principles of torts. For this purpose I used Robert Rabin's
excellent book. Perspectives on Tort Law. R. Rabin, Perspectives on Tort Law (2d ed.
1983). Many of the insights I gained for this article came from reading the wonderful
pieces which Professor Rabin has collected in the book and from his insightful questions
and comments at the conclusion of the selections.
46. See generally Calabresi, supra note 45; Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055 (1972) (hereinafter Calabresi and Hirschoffl;
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1980).
47. See Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1060.
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of strict liability would not delve into traditional negligence inquiries.
The word "unreasonable" would have no place in such schemes. At
the very least, unreasonableness would not be determinative, as it now
seems to be.
For instance, Dean Calabresi has articulated a theory that an actor
ought to be strictly liable whenever she is the cheapest cost avoider of
an accident.48 Although certain traditional negligence defenses such as
assumption of the risk might be relevant to determining who is the
cheapest cost avoider, 49 decision makers under this theory would not
undertake a risk/utility analysis to determine the "reasonability" of
risks. In fact, avoiding that balancing process and the attendant ad-
ministrative costs is one of the strengths of this type of strict liability. 0
In places throughout this paper I shall refer to the cheapest cost avoider
theory as "Calabresi strict liability." It is different from strict liability
in action because there is no case specific risk/utility balance involved.
If Calabresi strict liability is akin to negligence, it is only a distant
relation. Strict liability in action, on the other hand, is a first cousin,
or closer.
C. Absolute Liability
Courts and commentators often use the phrase strict liability in
reference to liability for engaging in ultrahazardous or abnormally dan-
gerous activities.' This form of liability is arguably derived from Rylands
v. Fletcher. 2 In Rylands the defendant, a lessee of land in a mining
area in England, built a reservoir for a mill. At the bottom of the
reservoir were unused mine shafts. When the lessee filled the reservoir
with water the mine shafts gave way and flooded the neighboring plain-
tiff's mine. The wet plaintiff sued the defendant with the dry reservoir,
and the courts that heard the case found the defendant liable even
though he was not personally negligent.
Despite a stormy early history in the United States,53 American courts
have extended the Rylands rationale to such categories as blasting, 4
48. See Calabresi, supra note 45, at 135 and Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note
46.
49. CaLabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1064-66.
50. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 252-65, 286-87.
51. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 2, ch. 13, § 78; W. Prosser, J. Wade & V.
Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts, ch. 14, 673-88 (8th ed. 1988) [hereinafter Prosser,
Wade & Schwartz]; Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 46.
52. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The lower courts' opinions are also worth reading as
they have been relevant to the development of the law. See, e.g., In the Exchequer, 3
H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865) and In the Exchequer Chamber, L.R. I Ex. 265
(1866).
53. See Prosser, Wade & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 679 nn.7 & 8.
54. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d II, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d
527 (1969).
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crop dusting," hazardous waste disposal,5 6 pile driving," chemical stor-
age," and various other uncommon, 9 but dangerous,w activities. Some
call this type of liability strict liability; I prefer to call it absolute
liability. 1
In Louisiana we have a similar liability rule for the above enumerated
activities. This rule apparently derives from Louisiana Civil Code articles
667 and 669, in conjunction with Article 2315.62 Whether Louisiana law
is different from our common law neighbors, and if so, how, are
interesting questions. For instance, there is a recent Louisiana Supreme
Court case, Butler v. Baber,63 which conspicuously omits the words
"ultrahazardous (or abnormally dangerous) activity" while imposing "667/
2315" liability. And, there is a court of appeal decision, Street v.
Equitable Petroleum Corp. and Energy Corp. of America,64 ostensibly
applying Butler, which states that "667/2315" liability may be imposed
without proof that an activity (storage/spillage of oil) is ultrahazardous. 6
Happily, for present purposes, these questions need not detain us. It
suffices to say that some Louisiana courts, like many common law
courts, refer to this type of liability as strict liability.M However, all
Louisiana judges have not followed suit.
In Kent, a most important case for my purposes, Justice Lemmon
referred to this category of tort liability as "absolute liability." In essence
it is Louisiana's version of Rylands.6' My colleague, Professor Frank
Maraist, like Justice Lemmon, also calls this type of liability absolute
liability.68 I humbly adopt their useful nomenclature. Why use that
phrase? Unlike a negligence case, or a strict liability in action case, in
a Rylands-type case there is no risk/utility balance undertaken at the
case-specific level. Generally, if the activity is one which exposes the
defendant to Rylands-type liability, he or she is liable despite the fact
55. Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855. 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
56. Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 Envtl.
L.N.W.U. 133 (1980).
57. Vern J. Oja & Assoc. v. Washington Park Towers Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 72, 569
P.2d 1141 (1977).
58. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1083-84, 249 So. 2d 133, 139-40
(1971).
59. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519-520, 520(d) (1977).
60. Id. at §§ 519-520(a) & (b).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
62. See, e.g., Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
63. 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 1988).
64. 532 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 889. Contra, Welcker v. Fair Grounds Corp., 577 So. 2d 301 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 670 (1991).
66. See, e.g., Langlois, 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (Interestingly, the court refers
to the case involving strict liability.).
67. Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498-99 (La. 1982).
68. F. Maraist, Louisiana Tort Law Cases and Materials, ch. 16 (1990 ed.).
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that the social utility of the activity may outweigh its risk.69 The activity
presents a reasonable risk of harm but the defendant is still liable.70
The risk from blasting to build a new dam may be valued at $900,000,
the utility at $2,000,000. Utility is greater than risk but the defendant
would nevertheless be found liable under an absolute liability theory.
Of course, the astute reader will note that one of the factors that
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (which Louisiana apparently does not
follow) counsels courts to consider in determining whether or not an
activity is abnormally dangerous is the extent to which the value of the
activity outweighs its dangerous attributes." Some scholars have criticized
the Restatement for including this "balance" among the relevant factors.
Moreover, the Restatement (Second) balance is only a factor; it is not
determinative of liability. In any absolute liability case, balancing is
necessarily involved; however, that balancing usually takes place at the
activity level. Should one who engages in this reasonable, but dangerous,
activity pay the damages she causes even though she has acted rea-
sonably? Courts decide whether or not, given the policies at stake, it
is appropriate to impose Rylands.type liability upon the activity in
question. Once a court determines an activity is within (or without) the
scope of Rylands absolute liability, it, in effect, creates a categorical
rule.72 Trial courts do not subsequently engage in a risk/utility balance
at the case specific level. Consistently, the Restatement provides that
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is for the court to decide.
It is, I suppose, a question of law.7" To the contrary, strict liability
requires a case-specific determination that risk outweighs utility, and,
69. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498. Prosser, Wade & Schwartz state:
Strict liability is "founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone who for
his own purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility
of relieving against that harm when it does in fact occur. The defendant's enterprise, in
other words, is required to pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes because
of its special, abnormal and dangerous character." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519
comment d (1977). The liability "is applicable to an activity that is carried on with all
reasonable care, and that is of such utility that the risk which is involved in it cannot
be regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to make it negligence merely to carry on
the activity at all." Id. at § 520, comment b. Observe also that the decision of whether
an activity is subject to strict liability is for the court, not the jury. Id. Prosser, Wade
& Schwartz, supra note 51, at 687 n.7.
70. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 comment b (1977).
71. Id. at § 520 (F).
72. There are cases that say this absolute liability (Rylands) inquiry is case by case.
See State v. Ventron Corp.. 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983). However, much of the
"analysis" goes on at the activity level. See, e.g., Prosser, Wade & Schwartz, supra note
51, at 685-86.
73. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 comment I (1977).
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whether risk outweighs utility in a strict liability case, 4 as in a negligence
case, is a question for the jury."
It is important to note there are defenses to absolute liability. For
instance, determining whether or not the risk is within the scope of the
defendant's absolute liability is always an issue.16 Phrased differently,
proximate cause or scope of duty is still an issue. No doubt, many
readers will recall the series of cases involving mother minks who ate
their babies because of the noise produced by blasting." Many courts
have held that such a risk was not within the scope of risks for which
they imposed absolute liability on the blasting defendant," therefore,
the defendant was not liable. In Louisiana we have the case of Holland
v. Keaveney.79 The defendant demolished a building. Some bees had
been living in one of the walls. The evicted and angry bees set out to
even the score. They lit upon plaintiff's rare and valuable dog and stung
it to death. The court stated that building demolition was an ultraha-
zardous activity; however, it did not hold the defendant liable. The
reason was because the dog's death was an "unanticipated" event. The
facts, though sad, certainly present the no proximate or no legal cause
defense in a more cultured setting than the baby mink cases.
Furthermore, in Kent, Justice Lemmon pointed out that in Louisiana
cases imposing liability for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity, the
defendant is "almost invariably the sole cause of the damage and the
victim seldom has the ability to protect himself. No decisions have
placed in this category any activities in which the victim or a third
person can reasonably be expected to be a contributing factor in the
causation of damages with any degree of frequency." 0 Whether the
74. See Spivey v. Super Valu, 575 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
75. L. Green, Judge and Jury (1930).
76. The Restatement provides: "This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm,
the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous." Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 519 (2) (1977).
77. See, e.g., Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954)
(risk of minks eating their babies as a result of nervousness caused by blasting not within
the risk for which the defendant is absolutely liable). Accord, Gronn v. Rogers Constr.,
Inc., 221 Or. 226. 350 P.2d 1086 (1960); Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah
552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942).
78. See, e.g., Foster, 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645.
79. 306 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 310 So. 2d 843 (1975).
80. Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 499 n.8 (La. 1982). The law in
other states has not been so limited. For instance, there is a famous case involving a
military installation in Alaska where dynamite was stored. Some vandals broke in, stole
dynamite, then blew up the storage area causing damage to nearby residences. The court
imposed absolute liability. Yukon Equip. Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 585 P.2d 1206
(Alaska 1978). Compare Bridges v. The Kentucky Stone Co., 425 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. 1981)
(Webb stole dynamite from defendant and three weeks later, over 100 miles away, blew
up plaintiff's home killing one son and injuring Bridges and another son).
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Louisiana Supreme Court has asked too little of the defendant is an
open question; however, the point is clear-scope of duty and/or legal
cause is a defense in an absolute liability case.
Additionally, one recent Louisiana court has found that comparative
negligence is a defense to an absolute liability claim."' Whatever the
merits of that conclusion, it at least shows that there are defenses to
absolute liability. In conclusion, let me reiterate my basic point. Rylands,
its progeny, its Louisiana kin, and the Restatement provisions dealing
with this type of liability are not what I call strict liability. Strict liability
entails a case specific risk/utility balance at the individual case level;
absolute liability does not. 2
D. Summary
Strict liability in action involves a negligence-type risk/utility balance.
Knowledge, however, is irrelevant; thus lack of knowledge is not a
defense. As such, strict liability in action may be expressed by a truncated
Learned Hand formula under which one is strictly liable if B - BK <
P x L where BK is the burden of discovering the risk. Strict liability
in action is different from Calabresi strict liability and absolute liability
because of the case specific risk/utility balance involved. It remains to
be seen in the following sections if we can explain why courts have
adopted this strict liability in action concept and what it does for us.
III. WHAT JUSTIFCATION?
What possible policy justifications are there for a doctrine under
which the decision maker is allowed to presume knowledge of the risk
before engaging in a risk/utility balance? Like any other torts writer,
I turn to the purposes of tort law whenever I hear the word "policy."
I also confess publicly that I do not relate this fact to my first year
Torts students until after they have tortured themselves with all those
proximate cause and duty/risk cases. With this confession noted, I
continue.
A. Compensation
Strict liability might be justified by the desire to compensate accident
victims. Legal economists have noted that assuring compensation to the
81. Pelt v. City of DeRidder, 553 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989). One
will note that the court referred to the case as a strict liability case, id. at 1098, but it
fits under my taxonomy as an absolute liability case. It arose under La. Civ. Code art.
667.
82. Cf. State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983) (court said Rylands-
type liability is decided on a case-by-case basis).
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injured victim is a distributional, rather than an efficiency-oriented,
concern." Thus, a society might care so much about compensation that
it would be willing to compensate even if doing so was inefficient. One
way to assure compensation to accident victims would be to create an
adequate state-run, no-fault scheme. Another would be to subsidize the
purchase of first party insurance. Another way to compensate would
be to make actors liable for all damages they cause, whether negligent
or not. Compensation also provides some rationale for absolute liability
(yet why is absolute liability so limited if compensation drives it?).
However, compensation does not explain strict liability in action.
How does compensation relate to the truncated Learned Hand test? It
doesn't-at least not to me.Y We could compensate very well without
looking at risk or utility. If anything, the balance gets in the way in
certain situations because it denies compensation in many cases. Certainly
one may suspect that the desire to compensate influenced courts to
impose strict liability; but why have the courts adopted the truncated
Learned Hand formula? Compensation, standing alone, does not explain
strict liability in action; it does not explain the unreasonable risk of
harm requirement; nor, does it explain the presumption of knowledge.
B. Risk Spreading
Like compensation, risk spreading is, in part, a distributional con-
cern." Professor Fleming James highlighted the risk spreading function
of torts.86 Liability ought to be imposed on the person in the best
position to spread the loss across the broadest segment of society. A
$100 risk should not rest upon an uninsured accident victim if another
participant in the accident has insurance that can spread the risk, or if
the other can spread risk by charging her customers a little more for
her goods and services. Risk spreading may provide a reason to shift
a loss from the victim to another. Recall Oliver Wendell Holmes told
his readers there had to be a good reason to shift a loss away from
where it originally fell. 7
83. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 45, at 28 n.6.
84. Of course, the truncated Learned Hand test may relate to compensation if it
makes recovery easier. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
85. See supra note 83. See also Calabresi, supra note 45, ch. 4, at 39-67.
86. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
Yale L.J. 549 (1948). For a fascinating study of James' work and his reliance on risk
distribution as a justification for rules in torts, see Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J.
Leg. Stud. 461 (1985).
87. See O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, 94 (1881). Cf. Calabresi, supra note 45,
at 261-62.
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Turning from one great judge to another, Justice Traynor emphasized
risk spreading as a justification for strict products liability."8 But now,
with improved first party health and disability insurance and increased
medical assistance for the indigent, is risk spreading as persuasive a
reason for imposing liability as it once was? I hazard to speculate that
even though first party insurance and government programs (such as
Medicare and Medicaid) are better and more widespread than they were
when James and Traynor wrote, they are still not comprehensive, and
they are subject to legislative adjustment. The originally growing, later
contracting, now growing again pool that is the Medicaid program is
evidence of this. 9 Perhaps absent a pervasive, comprehensive, consis-
tently available scheme of first party medical and disability insurance,
courts will continue to indulge in the presumption that those with third
party insurance and access to markets are better risk spreaders than
their victims. Courts may indulge in this presumption even though first
party insurance is more efficient and, by definition, cheaper than third
party insurance. Whatever one concludes about these issues, risk spread-
ing, like compensation, does not explain strict liability in action. First,
strict liability, like negligence, requires a causal relation between the
defendant's product or thing and the plaintiff's injuries. Risk spreading,
pushed to its extreme, would require no such relationship. Theoretically,
the best risk spreaders should pay whether they were involved in the
injury-producing event or not. Torts has never gone that far.
Refocusing on the current subject, risk spreading considerations alone
would place liability on the better risk spreader-plaintiff or defendant.
There would be no reason to get into unreasonable risks of harm. There
would be no reason to presume knowledge. One might note that man-
ufacturers intuitively are good risk spreaders because of insurance, albeit
third party, and access to markets but, why stop at manufacturers?
Why retain the unreasonably dangerous requirement?
As to those with the "garde" of unreasonably dangerous things,
they are frequently business people who, we can assume, have insurance,
albeit third party, and access to markets. They are plant owners, railroad
operators, and other business people. These guardians are in a position
similar to manufacturers. Another type of custodian subject to Article
2317 liability is the homeowner who has homeowner's insurance. Risk
spreading is a persuasive justification for homeowner liability, even if
less persuasive here than it is with the business custodian. But, again
88. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
89. See, National Health Policy Forum, Through the Looking Glass: An Overview
of Medicaid Today, Issue Brief #457 (George Washington University 1987), reprinted in
C. Havighurst, Health Care Law and Policy 112 (1988).
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why the unreasonable risk of harm element? France has not so limited
its "strict liability" article.9 And, why no inquiry into the plaintiff's
ability to spread risk, i.e. through first party insurance? As with com-
pensation, risk spreading alone does not explain strict liability in action.
C. Morality
Morality considerations certainly may justify liability rules. Concern
for compensation and risk spreading is, after all, rooted in moral values-
or sympathy. Recall that even a dog knows the difference between being
kicked and tripped over.9' A society might conclude that where someone
is injured by a product or a thing produced by a manufacturer or held
by a custodian, fairness dictates that the manufacturer or custodian who
has produced, owned, and/or benefitted from the product or thing ought
to bear the loss. This is a reflection perhaps of a rather primal notion
that where one person's property injures another, the owner ought to
pay. We are, one might argue, allowed to do whatever we want so long
as we do not hurt others. Or, perhaps we might add that one who
benefits from an injury causing product or thing must pay whether or
not she is negligent. Alternatively one might state that between two
"innocents" the one who benefitted from the injury producing product,
thing, or activity involved ought to pay.
To the contrary, one might argue that fault-in the sense of blame-
worthiness-has become a relevant moral criterion in our society. That
is, in America we generally should not impose liability where someone
is not at fault. As I read Holmes' lectures on tort in The Common
Law,92 this is his basic point. Someone stuck on maxims might say:
One is allowed to do whatever one wants to do as long as one doesn't
commit an intentional tort or fail to exercise due care. Only when one
acts with "fault" should one be liable. It seems that precisely these
moral questions underlie tort reform debates.
At this point I will end this morality play. With confidence I can
say that others know, or believe they know, more about morals than
I do; I have said enough to draw some simple conclusions. First, as I
said, morality might justify a liability-without-fault rule. Second, how-
ever, morality does not explain the truncated Learned Hand formula.
In fact, if a society adopted such a liability-without-fault rule, risk,
utility, and unreasonably dangerous are concepts that need not enter
the fact finder's thought processes. Alternatively, if a society's morality
scheme dictated liability only % .here fault was involved, its tort rules
would limit liability to "blameworthy" conduct; they would not presume
90. See, e.g., Ross v. La Coste DeMonterville, 502 So. 2d 1026, 1032 (La. 1987).
91. O.W. Holmes, supra note 87, at 3.
92. Id. at 77-110.
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knowledge. From this moral perspective one cannot really be "blamed"
if one did not know or should not have known of a risk beforehand,
for how could a person without knowledge of a risk morally appreciate
what he or she was doing?
Professor Fletcher has argued for a moral basis of liability whenever
an actor causes injury to the plaintiff through the creation of a non-
reciprocal risk. 93 Reciprocity is gauged in reference to the universe of
commonly accepted background risks. Perhaps an unreasonably risky
product or thing poses'a non-reciprocal risk on an injured victim but
the reasoning seems a little circular to me. Courts, in deciding if an
actor is strictly liable, do not talk about reciprocity; they talk about
risk, utility, and presumed knowledge. Further, nothing inherent in the
concept of reciprocal risk even implicates a presumption of knowledge.
One could say perhaps, that it just seems fair to presume knowledge
because the defendant has superior access to information and might
even try to suppress relevant information. Accepting these assumptions,
the presumption of knowledge might be fair. But should it apply in
every case? Should it be irrebuttable? These are issues I address later.
To summarize, morality has not satisfied me in my search for an
explanation of strict liability in action. If the reader feels otherwise,
now would be a good place to stop reading because it only gets murkier.
D. History
The truncated Hand formula grew out of the work of scholars like
Professor John Wade and Dean Page Keeton. While it has its roots,
as noted repeatedly, in negligence, that does not explain it. Why adopt
it? France, like Louisiana, has strict liability, but the French do not
limit it to unreasonably dangerous things. 94 Theirs is much broader.
Belgium, like Louisiana, limits strict liability" to unreasonably dangerous
things. Be that as it may, this little sojourn into comparative law does
not explain the truncated Hand formula. What other jurisdictions do
may provide the justification for a decision after a court decides what
to do. It may even push in the direction of deciding what to do, but
it does not explain strict liability in action.
E. Deterrence
Dean Calabresi has argued that a strict liability system in certain
contexts might lead to more efficient deterrence than would a fault-
93. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972).
94. See, Ross, 502 So. 2d at 1032; Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act
of Things: A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 La. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
95. See King v. Louviere, 543 So. 2d 1327 (La. 1989).
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based system.9 Turning to the present arena, the manufacturer of a
product, and to a lesser extent, the custodian of an unreasonably dan-
gerous thing, are in the best position to detect defects in their products
or things. One might note that the presumption of knowledge forces
the custodian or manufacturer to discover or pay. Likewise, the man-
ufacturer is in the best position to develop safer products. The custodian
is in the best position to "own or guard" safer things. A rule holding
someone liable, without negligence, for damages caused by her products
may well encourage efforts to make products or things safer." Likewise,
Calabresi-type liability would ideally cause those subject to it to take
account of all of the costs of their activities. 98 If the defendant sells a
product, as a manufacturer does, heightened liability will increase the
manufacturer's costs, which will increase the price. This in turn will
lower production. Consumers will then face prices that include accident
costs. Consumers need not add accident costs to the price; the price
would already include those costs. Thus, consumers purchase at appro-
priate levels. 99 But, if liability is to be imposed according to its deterrence
benefits, why limit this liability to unreasonably dangerous products and
things? Dean Calabresi does not. He, as noted earlier, would hold the
cheapest cost avoider liable in contexts other than just products liability
and Louisiana Article 2317 "thing" cases.1° °
There are, of course, counter arguments to Calabresi. Peter Huber
has contended that strict products liability leads to over deterrence.'0'
It might cause the cessation of the production of useful products,
increased prices for products still produced, and a chilling effect on the
production of new products. The reason is no doubt attributable to the
effect of uncertainty on human behavior and most basically to the fact
that Calabresi-type liability would probably increase a manufacturers'
costs, as noted above.
There is an important theoretical point here that merits a simple
explanation and sheds some light on this debate. In the absence of
transaction costs and victim fault (which we can assume for now) both
strict liability and negligence are efficient.10 Both adequately deter with-
out over deterring. Return for a moment to the hypotheticals set forth
96. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 45 and Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 46.
97. See Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1062.
98. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 69-70.
99. Id. For a wonderful description and critique of Calabresi's theory of liability,
see Blum and Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General
Deterrence, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 239 (1967).
100. Calabresi, supra note 45, deals with strict liability in the automobile accident
contexts.
101. P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences, ch. 10 (1988).
102. See, e.g., A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 37-49 (1983).
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above relating to the car with the bad brakes. The manufacturer faced
a $25,000 loss which would have cost it $500,001 to avoid. The failure
to find and install the missing part was not negligent under the Learned
Hand negligence formula, so the manufacturer would neither pay the
$25,000 nor incur the $500,001 cost of avoidance. Under both Calabresi
strict liability and the truncated Hand formula, the manufacturer would
still not incur the cost of avoidance because $500,001 is greater than
$25,000, the ex ante cost of the accident happening. But, the manu-
facturer would have to pay the $25,000. As a result, under either rule
the outcome is efficient; the $500,001 is not spent and the accident
happens, but, in one case the manufacturer does not owe $25,000
(negligence) and in the other (Calabresi strict liability) it does. The
difference is purely distributional.103
Likewise, in the Article 2317 hypothetical, the custodian under a
negligence rule will not incur the costs of discovery, buying the brake
defect monitoring machine, because together with the other relevant
accident avoidance costs B ($25,200) exceeds P x L ($25,000). Concom-
itantly, the custodian will not pay the $25,000 because she is not neg-
ligent. Under a Calabresi strict liability rule if the custodian is the
cheapest cost avoider she will still not get the brakes repaired because
$25,200 is greater than $25,000; however, the custodian will pay the
accident costs. Again, the difference is purely distributionil. Under either
rule the outcome, from an accident avoidance perspective, is efficient.
Either rule efficiently deters.
Although either rule is efficient, the rules do have different distri-
butional effects because defendants pay more in accident costs under
Calabresi strict liability than they do under a fault system, so they have
less wealth. This might result in some contraction of the industry. The
issue becomes even more complex where one relaxes various simplifying
assumptions dealing with victim fault aid the effect of levels of activity
on accident frequency. However, the conclusion is clear; whether neg-
ligence or Calabresi strict liability is more efficient depends upon the
circumstances.' 04 Thus the deterrence issue is muddied.
Importantly, however, Calabresi "strict" liability is really more like
absolute liability, as I have used that phrase. Under Calabresi's approach,
the decision maker determines who the cheapest cost avoider is, not
whether risks are unreasonable. Decision makers do not consider risk
and utility; they do not engage in presumptions of knowledge. Thus
the deterrence argument must be explored under the truncated Hand
formula for strict liability.
103. See Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1077.
104. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 46.
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Deterrence in the context of the truncated Hand formula is equally
unsettling. Does the formula encourage an over investment in knowledge
or not? Clearly it encourages people to develop cheap ways to discover
and avoid risk. But does it ask us to spend too much? Problems may
well arise because the actor does not know the costs of discovery until
those costs are incurred but in no case would a rational actor spend
greater than P x L on discovery. A rational actor would still rather
pay judgments, or premiums, than excessive discovery costs. Again, the
ambiguities inherent in deterrence do not explain the rule we have.
Interestingly, one of Calabresi's arguments for what he calls strict
liability relates to the failures of the fault (negligence) system. He points
to the focus on historic facts and particularistic, uncommon events.10s
He also points to the high costs of case-by-case decision making char-
acteristic of a negligence regime.106 It is here that we may see some
theoretical justification for strict liability in action. But, in the interests
of full disclosure, I warn the reader not to get her hopes up because,
like everywhere else, there are problems here too.
F. Administrative Costs
Courts have long crafted tort rules in light of their potential effect
on the administration of justice. 1 7 Many traditional "no duty" rules
were based on the fear that potential liability would open the floodgates
of litigation; this is an administrative costs argument.'0 It appeals to
the courts' concerns for their own time and ability. Case-by-case decision
making is expensive. It is expensive for sovereigns funding court systems;
it is expensive for judges, lawyers, parties, witnesses, and all their
families. One way to avoid this expense would be to create "categorical
liability rules" or "no liability rules" which would do away with, or
cut back on, case-by-case decision making. I have a hunch that absolute
liability rules may essentially do this. Rules are made at the activity
level and then courts can more easily apply those rules to particular
cases. In those particular cases the parties need not litigate the question
of whether or not the activity is one that is subjected to absolute liability.
That question has been previously answered and memorialized in a rule.
Obviously negligence cases provide a dynamic contrast. Each case
is decided on its own facts. Decision makers consider the issue of
knowledge in light of the particular facts involved as well as risk pre-
vention. Likewise, strict liability in action cases require a case-by-case
105. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 255-63.
106. Id. at 286-87.
107. See L. Green, supra note 75, at 74-96.
108. See id. See also Galligan, Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive
Damages, 51 La. L. Rev. 6, 42-44 (1990) [hereinafter Augmented Awards).
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examination of risk and utility to determine if the product or thing is
unreasonably dangerous. However, there is, as noted, a difference be-
tween negligence and strict liability in action, and that difference relates
to the knowledge issue. Knowledge is presumed or, in other words, lack
of knowledge is not a defense in strict liability cases. In present parlance,
knowledge or the lack thereof is not an issue at trial. The parties need
not litigate it; the judge and jury need not concern themselves with it.
What benefits, if any, does this provide? It arguably reduces the costs
of the trial.
First, not litigating the knowledge issue arguably cuts down on trial
time. It takes away one of the two components of the definition of
negligence. It removes BK from B for the decision maker using the
Learned Hand formula. It reduces the Learned Hand formula to a risk
versus utility analysis-knowledge is sidestepped. Parties seeking to per-
suade on the knowledge issue might be expected to elicit expert testimony
on the subject. Persuading the fact finder on the knowledge issue nec-
essarily takes up time at trial-both the judge's and jurors' time. Con-
comitantly, the knowledge issue frequently involves a difficult credibility
question. That is, the defendant testifies-that she neither knew nor
should have known of the risk whereas the plaintiff presents evidence
that defendant knew or should have known of the risk. Ultimately, it
comes down to a judgment call by the jury-whom should it believe?
Resolving such credibility questions, while part of the jury's job, takes
time. The presumption of knowledge takes this "credibility" question
out of the case and saves time. By removing the knowledge issue from
the trial, strict liability in action reduces the trial's complexity.
Empirically, I would not be surprised to find that lawyers spend
significant time and energy arguing about what defendants in negligence
cases knew or should have known about risks. Likewise, the effort to
persuade on the knowledge issue requires discovery on the issue. It
mandates investigations concerning prior incidents. It involves discovering
and studying those incidents.
Thus, one could argue that the presumption of knowledge reduces
the administrative costs of case-by-case decision making where it applies.
It keeps the case-by-case approach for risk and utility but not for
knowledge. Courts have noted the administrative savings accompanying
presumptions of knowledge. In Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. ,19
Justice Dennis of the Louisiana Supreme Court, while discussing the
unreasonably dangerous per se category of cases wherein state of the
art evidence was inadmissible, stated:
The costs of administering the unreasonably dangerous per se
category of products liability cases will be reduced by eliminating
109. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
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litigation over the date when a product's danger became sci-
entifically knowable. In unreasonably dangerous per se cases, as
in construction defect cases now, the parties should not be forced
to produce experts in the history of science and technology to
speculate, and possibly confuse jurors, as to what knowledge
was available and what improvements were feasible in a given
year."'0
Amongst other sources, Justice Dennis cited the New Jersey Supreme
Court's opinion in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp."' In
Beshada the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that compliance with
the state of the art at the time of manufacture would not exculpate a
defendant manufacturer in a failure to warn/asbestos case. One of the
factors underlying the court's decision was the effect that consideration
of state of the art evidence would have had on the "[flact finding
process."" 2 It stated:
Scientific knowability, as we understand it, refers not to
what in fact was known at the time, but to what could have
been known at the time. In other words, even if no scientist
had actually formed the belief that asbestos was dangerous, the
hazards would be deemed "knowable" if a scientist could have
formed that belief by applying research or performing tests that
were available at the time. Proof of what could have been known
will inevitably be complicated, costly, confusing and time-con-
suming. Each side will have to produce experts in the history
of science and technology to speculate as to what knowledge
was feasible in a given year. We doubt that juries will be capable
of even understanding the concept of scientific knowability, much
less be able to resolve such a complex issue. Moreover, we
should resist legal rules that will so greatly add to the costs
both sides incur in trying a case."'
I could not have said it better myself. The New Jersey court noted
another important issue relating to cost and knowledge. Knowledge is
further complicated because if a defendant had no actual knowledge of
a risk, one must inquire as to what she should or even could"' have
110. Id. at 119.
111. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
112. Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 548.
113. Id. at 207-208. 447 A.2d at 548 (emphasis added).
114. See Galligan, The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense of It All, 49
La. L. Rev. 629, 672-75 (1989) [hereinafter Making Sense], wherein your author humbly
(but ably) argued that there is a difference between what one knew or could have known
of and what one knew or should have known of. The latter is the accepted statement
of the standard for knowledge in negligence whereas the Louisiana Products Liability Act,
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known. This plunges the decision maker into an investigation of whether
the manufacturer or custodian had adequately invested in research and
development before the time of manufacture. This is expensive to de-
termine."' Both Halphen and Beshada have been subsequently limited;"16
however, what they say about the cost of the knowledge issue still holds
true.
Reliance on a truncated negligence formula may be cost effective
for another reason. As Dean Wade noted,'' 7 it allows judges and juries
to deal with familiar concepts, concepts familiar to them from negligence
law-risk and utility. Although Dean Keeton ' and others have noted
that strict products liability is separate and distinct from negligence,
even he advocated a risk/utility approach for determining if a product
is unreasonably dangerous. The familiar risk/utility test lets courts apply
the same factors they apply in negligence cases-except knowledge-in
strict liability in action cases. By resorting to a truncated negligence
test, courts may have avoided the time and confusion inherent in the
development of new legal doctrine. Certainly even truncated negligence
formulas have led to unrest and litigation; however, one need only
compare the development of strict liability in France under Civil Code
article 1384"19 with its development in Louisiana under Article 2317 to
conclude that the Louisiana experience has been far smoother. 20 For,
in the great state of Louisiana, the courts adopted an unreasonable risk
of harm requirement which the French did not. France's decision has
led to one hundred years of confusion in French jurisprudence and the
development of countless subsidiary rules.' 2' Happily, we have avoided
that chaos in Louisiana. No doubt Louisiana still has time to experience
an eruption of new rules; however, the close kinship between strict
liability in action and negligence may save us. It has certainly eased
our development of strict liability under Article 2317.
But why then has strict liability in action been so limited? If a
presumption of knowledge really saves time, why have not courts more
in defining the state of the art, uses the phrase "knew or could" have known. See La.
R.S. 9:2800.59(A) and (B) (1991). In actuality, the phrase "knew or could have known"
was taken from the certified question in Halphen. Likewise, the court in Beshada used
the same standard of knew or could have known.
11S. See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 208, 447 A.2d at 548-49.
116. See La. R.S. 9:2800.52-.59 (1991); Galligan, Making Sense, supra note 114.
Beshada has also been limited. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 455,
479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984) (limiting Beshada to asbestos cases).
117. Wade, supra note 15, at 838-41.
118. Keeton, supra note 24, at 37.39.
119. See Tomlinson, supra note 94. See also Taylor, "No Fault" Takes a French
Twist: A French Re-Examination of the Nature of Liability, 9 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.
L.J. 545 (1987).
120. See Ross v. La Coste DeMonterville, 502 So. 2d 1026, 1029-32 (La. 1987).
121. Id. at 1031.
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generally adopted it in ordinary negligence cases? Nationally, the answer
is not clear. Perhaps the imposition of non-delegable duties' serves
some of this function in some classes of cases. In Louisiana the pre-
sumption of knowledge is rather widespread. It applies in products
cases' and in any case where a thing causes injury.2" That leaves cases
where man alone (or man and a "safe" thing) causes damage. In such
cases the risk is usually known or knowable so a presumption of knowl-
edge would add little. Imagine a speeding defendant who injures the
plaintiff. Do we seriously contend that a court must presume a defendant
has knowledge that speeding is dangerous? Everyone knows that; no
court would entertain a serious claim that the defendant did not know
of the risks of speeding. Because all know of the risk, the cost of
knowledge is $0; thus a presumption of knowledge would add nothing.
For B (whatever it is) - O(BK) still equals B. This, of course, is true
in any strict liability case where the defendant has knowledge that its
product or thing is dangerous. In such a case, like Kent was, BK is $0
so B - BK equals B which renders the strict liability case no more than
a garden variety negligence case.' 2 5
Anecdotally, one recent case provides some evidence for the ad-
ministrative efficiency of a presumption of knowledge.2 6 There was an
explosion in the catalytic cracking unit at Shell's facility in Norco,
Louisiana. Lawsuits followed; one was a class action. Shell was willing
to settle certain claims of one class admitting it was strictly liable under
Article 2317 but not negligent. The parties thus avoided a costly dispute
over the knowledge issue. Interestingly, the settlement also signifies that
a defendant may be willing to admit to strict liability but not the
blameworthiness attached to negligence. That is, it will admit it had an
unreasonably dangerous thing in its custody but not that it knew. Ad-
mitting knowledge might be bad for its public image. Thus, it may be
willing to fight and spend on that issue alone. The presence of a
presumption of knowledge avoids that fight.
In short, administrative concerns may help to explain strict liability
in action. Of course, as with any justification, there are counter ar-
guments.
122. Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968). As
a realist, one is left with the definite impression that Louisiana courts using Louisiana
Civil Code article 2317 reach the same results in cases that common law courts reach
employing negligence. Not only do courts use the fiction of the non-delegable duty, but.
they also impose duties to discover defects. See, e.g., Shaw v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co.,
582 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
123. See Galligan, Making Sense, supra note 114, at 668-70, 678.
124. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
125. See Lablit v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 581 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991), as quoted and discussed in supra note 31.
126. In re Shell Oil Refinery, Civil Action Nos. 88-1935, 88-2719 (E.D. La. 1991).
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G. Problems With The Presumption of Knowledge
1. Recovery v. Administrative Savings
Strict liability, as noted in the deterrence discussion, may cause
defendants to pay more judgments or spend too much on discovering
risks. This will affect their cash flow and may in the short run impact
their economic positions. However, even if one were to assume that the
presumption of knowledge might lead to some short term economic
dislocation for defendants we still might find that the administrative
gains from not litigating the knowledge issue offset the arguable societal
losses caused by allowing recovery. There may be other types of cases
where the administrative gains do not offset the perceived losses. In
such cases the truncated Hand formula would be inefficient. The trick
would be to identify those cases. Right now, I dare not attempt such
a weighty task; however, we can point to certain types of cases where
courts and legislatures have relaxed presumptions of knowledge in strict
liability cases.
One that immediately comes to mind in the field of products liability
is the handling of the state of the art defense. Most state courts and
legislatures that have considered the issue in the design and warning
contexts have concluded that manufacturers who, at the time the product
on trial left their control, neither knew nor could have known about
their product's dangers or about safer alternatives, are not liable.
27
Courts will not hold manufacturers to a standard requiring knowledge
of the unknowable. Halphen and Beshada, rightly or wrongly from a
policy perspective, have been limited. 18 For instance, in Louisiana design
and warning cases, there is now an interesting mix of strict liability and
negligence concepts.' 29 A plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case
under a time of trial, strict liability type standard. Knowledge of risk,
safer alternatives, and feasibility of safer products are presumed. To
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that under those
127. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:2800.52-.59 (1991). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-
681, 12-683 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-116-104 (1987); Idaho Code § [6-1406] 6-1306
(1948, 1979, 1980); Ind. Code § 33-1-1.5-4 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.310 (Baldwin
1991); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.764 (Vernon 1988); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21, 182 (1989);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105 (1980); Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296
(7th Cir. 1987); Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F. Supp 1317 (E.D. Tex. 1983);
Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., 153 Ariz. 389, 737 P.2d 365 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985), vacated in part, 153 Ariz. 400, 737 P.2d 376 (1987); Malin v. Union Carbide
Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 428, 530 A.2d 794 (1987); Maxted v. Pacific Car and Foundry
Co., 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974).
128. See sources cited in supra note 116.
129. See Galligan, Making Sense, supra note 114, at 648-85.
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presumptions the product's risks are greater than its utility."0 Then, the
defendant may exculpate herself by proving that at the time ot production
she was not negligent although the standard of care may be somewhat
higher than in an ordinary negligence case.' 3' Stated differently, the
plaintiff avoids a directed verdict under the truncated Learned Hand
formula by establishing B - BK < P x L. The plaintiff bears the burden
of proof here and, obviously, the defendant may dispute the plaintiff's
claim. However, the defendant will prevail, even though the jury believes
the plaintiff, if the defendant carries the burden of proof on a reverse
Learned Hand formula; that is, the defendant pays (assuming plaintiff
proves B - BK < P x L) unless it shows B > P x L. 32 Returning to
the relevancy of state of the art, decision makers no doubt concluded
an irrebuttable presumption of knowledge in design and warning cases
would hinder production and development of newer and safer products.
Alternatively, they may have decided that an irrebuttable presumption
would cut too deeply into the profits of producers. Who knows? How-
ever, where entire product lines are attacked one might conclude that
the effect of an irrebuttable presumption of knowledge would be great
in terms of its influence on a manufacturer's conduct. One might also
expect such a presumption to attract claims and claimants which, as
noted in the next section, might offset any supposed administrative gain.
Interestingly, the presumption of knowledge remains irrebuttable in
mismanufacture cases.'3 Perhaps here, decision makers, seeing that there
are not an inordinate number of claims, and that product lines are not
attacked but merely single products, decided that an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of knowledge would not be too harsh. Concomitantly, the
gain in savings from a presumption of knowledge is potentially significant
in individual mismanufacture cases. This is because plaintiffs, whose
sympathies decision makers have probably adopted, need not challenge
the implementation and operation of quality control programs and their
costs. Moreover, because such suits, as noted, only affect individual
products, the effect on the manufacturer's "bottom line" is probably
not great. Moreover, the pool of plaintiffs is more limited in misman-
ufacture cases than in design and warning cases.
Turning to Article 2317 strict liability in Louisiana, some courts
have been equally "flexible" with the presumption of knowledge. In
Bell v. State of Louisiana'34 the plaintiff was leaving a football game
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 553 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
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at the Louisiana Superdome in New Orleans when she tripped on a
hole in some padding. She sued the state as custodian of the Superdome
alleging strict liability under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317. The
appellate court held that the state was not strictly liable concluding that
it would be unrealistic to expect maintenance employees to discover and
fix all the holes throughout the Superdome, 135 i.e. such an obligation
would cost too much. The reasoning is contrary to what would happen
under an irrebuttable presumption of knowledge. Perhaps the court
perceived the discovery costs to be so high that it decided to jettison
the presumption of knowledge approach and not hold the state strictly
liable. The opinion gives little insight on this important point.
In fact, after the incident in Bell the Louisiana legislature passed
a statute which basically does away with Article 2317 strict liability
claims against the state in non-building cases. The plaintiff now must
prove that the state either knew or had constructive knowledge (should
have known) of the risk which caused the injury as well as its unrea-
sonably dangerous condition. 36 Perhaps the legislature could have de-
termined that imposing a presumption of knowledge upon the state was
inappropriate, but why? The state provides services which private in-
dustry does not. Frequently this is so because providing these services
is not profitable enough to attract entrepreneurs. Under this hypothesis,
a presumption of knowledge which made recovery somewhat easier for
plaintiffs might unduly burden the state financially. As such, the leg-
islature has prohibited the use of a presumption of knowledge against
the state in non-building cases. Interestingly, the legislature preserved
strict liability, and its presumption of knowledge, where defects in state
buildings cause injuries.
Returning to the private sector, how irrebuttable is the presumption
of knowledge in Louisiana strict liability cases? In Entrevia v. Hood'17
the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated what may be a different ap-
proach to Article 2317 strict liability, that is, different from the Kent
presumption of knowledge approach. As I read the case, the court did
not abandon the presumption of knowledge approach. Instead, it noted
that the presumption of knowledge approach presents "a useful approach
... a helpful, although indirect way to show judges familiar with
weighing considerations of social utility in negligence cases that the
policy consideration part of the judicial process should not be different
in cases under article 2317.' 'Il But, then the court went on to state
135. The court stated: "It would be unrealistic to expect maintenance employees to
find and immediately repair every tiny hole or missing grout in the stairs and walkways
in a structure as large as the Superdome." Id. at 908.
136. La. R.S. 9:2800 (1991).
137. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
138. Id. at 1150.
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that "the suggested method [the presumption of knowledge] is indirect
and entirely unnecessary once the judge understands that the standards
or patterns of utility and morality which he must consider in deciding
if a risk is unreasonable will be found in the life of the community,
in the same way that they will be found by the legislator."'3 9
I must admit I tarry over the words "entirely unnecessary;" what
do they mean? Is the presumption of knowledge no longer a viable
analytic method? What replaces it? Whatever the answers to these ques-
tions, the court did expressly note that negligence and Article 2317 cases
are not identical because: "the inability of a defendant to know or
prevent the risk is not a defense in a strict liability case but precludes
a finding of negligence.'"1° So whatever the "entirely unnecessary"
language meant for the presumption of knowledge, even under the
Entrevia court's language, knowledge is still clearly not an issue in strict
liability.
Furthermore, I am not sure what the court means by "prevent the
risk." I read it in connection with knowledge. If a defendant did not
know of a risk she could not prevent its occurrence; that fact is not a
defense in a strict liability case. I do not believe that the court is saying
that where the burden of avoiding a risk (aside from the burden of
discovering the risk) is greater than the severity of any expected accident,
discounted to present value, there is still strict liability. In that case the
risk of harm would be reasonable not unreasonable.
Finally, recall that the court in Entrevia emphasized that there is a
difference between strict liability and negligence cases. Perhaps all the
quoted language from Entrevia was meant to do was serve as a coun-
terweight or balance to Kent. Justice Lemmon's opinion in Kent em-
phasized the similarities between Article 2317 and strict liability. Kent
presented those similarities. In Kent the defendant had knowledge of
the risks its thing, an uninsulated electric line, presented. As a result,
the cost of obtaining knowledge, BK, was 0. Therefore B - BK = B.
Consequently, it was exactly the same as a negligence case-it was
actually decided as a negligence case. "Strict" liability-the presumption
of knowledge-added nothing! This is always true where BK = 0. Thus
in a case like Kent, strict liability and negligence meet. However, Entrevia
warns the uncritical reader not to overemphasize the similarities. Oster
seems to reiterate all that Kent and Entrevia say. The earlier quote 41
was quite consistent with Kent. However, later in Oster, Justice Cole
wrote:
Although courts, including this court, have described the
unreasonable risk of harm criterion as requiring the court to
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying note 30.
[Vol. 52
STRICT LIABILITY IN ACTION
balance the likelihood and magnitude of harm against the utility
of the thing, the balancing test required by the unreasonable
risk of harm criterion does not lead itself well to such neat,
mathematical formulations. In addition to the likelihood and
magnitude of the risk and the utility of the thing, the interpreter
should consider a broad range of social, economic, and moral.
factors including the cost to the defendant of avoiding the risk
and the social utility of the plaintiff's conduct at the time of
the accident." 2
The second quoted sentence reads a lot like Entrevia, stressing the fact
that the court must consider all relevant social factors. Of course the
first sentence, and the first clause of the second sentence emphasize the
risk/utility test. In any event, might one push Entrevia even further?
Highlighting the "do what a legislator would do" approach one
might agree that although the truncated Hand formula is useful, courts
retain the power to abandon it in cases where utility and morality point
in a different direction. It seems, despite what the court said about
knowledge in Oster above, that the costs of discovery might well be a
relevant factor to a legislator in certain types of cases. Liability without
regard to the costs of obtaining knowledge might impose undue costs
on society. Design and warning cases are one area where, by legislation
in Louisiana, knowledge is a relevant criteria. Now, by statute, Article
2317 liability of the government is another. The plaintiff must prove
knowledge or constructive knowledge. If under Entrevia the courts are
to put themselves in the position of a legislator and legislators have
concluded that, in particular cases, knowledge should be an issue, might
not courts do the same? Cases where the presumption of knowledge
would lead to inefficiencies beyond the savings in time in not litigating
the knowledge issue are a prime example. One problem with this freedom
would be that case-by-case deviation from the truncated Hand formula
would eat into its alleged administrative savings. Moreover, I wonder
if Oster may inhibit the freedom to consider knowledge that I have
grafted onto Entrevia for argument's sake.
In any event, an interesting side issue arises. Could it be that the
presumption of knowledge is most useful and most efficient in cases
where courts feel the cost of knowledge (BK) is not great? That is, a
presumption of knowledge might be most useful where BK is usually
small and is unlikely to make a great difference in the B < P x L
balance. If that is true then strict liability cases will turn out like most
negligence cases (except those at the margin)."34 The difference is we
142. Oster v. DOTD, State of La., 582 So. 2d 1285, 1289 (La. 1991).
143. If BK is very small it is unlikely that removing it from consideration will have
any outcome on the effect of the case except when B - BK is almost equal to P x L in
which case any BK may make a difference.
19911
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
will not spend time and money investigating and litigating over a usually
small figure, BK. Both of the hypotheticals cited earlier'" involved huge
BK's. Under the logic set forth in this paragraph they would not be
good candidates for strict liability. This hypothesis may explain why in
some cases, where BK is arguably large, such as design and warning
cases where a state of the art question arises, the strict liability in action
presumption of knowledge is relaxed. I believe the evidence and con-
clusions in this regard would be spotty and erratic.
So where does that leave Louisiana with regard to the truncated
Hand formula? To me it seems a fine way to charge juries in deciding
whether a thing or product is unreasonably dangerous. 4  However,
appellate courts, especially the Louisiana Supreme Court, may have more
power to reexamine results under the truncated Hand formula by taking
a look at all factors under the "Entrevia test." As a jury or judge
usually will have decided that risk is greater than utility in finding
liability, the court ought not lightly dispose of that finding. Since the
lower court decision maker did not consider knowledge nor its cost, the
appellate court might want to examine the effect of the presumption of
knowledge on the primary activity of the defendant and others like her
vis-a-vis the administrative savings the presumption engenders. In making
that inquiry, courts should focus on categories of defendants and things,
thus instructing future trial judges. This would preserve the truncated
Hand formula's administrative gains in the large "category" of cases.
Alternatively, one might argue that the risk/utility balance only goes
to a determination of "breach." That is, did the defendant breach her
duty to manufacture safe products and keep safe things? Or, did the
thing or product present an unreasonable risk of harm? Then all the
language in Entrevia and Oster regarding social and moral factors, factors
other than risk and utility, could be read as a reminder that "breach,"
the failure to exercise the relevant level of care, is not all there is to
the case. In a strict liability case the level of care is ordinary, reasonable
care; but, the duty to exercise that level of care is triggered whether or
not defendant knew or should have known of the relevant risk. However,
before the standard of care is apposite, there must be a duty to protect
the plaintiff from the relevant risk. In that vein one must look at the
parties and their relationship. Additionally, the breach of a duty must
legally or proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries. On that question,
the decision maker would want to consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the victim's injury. So, risk and utility-the unreasonably
dangerous requirement-might relate only to the breach issue while the
other factors are still relevant. But they are relevant to the question of
144. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
145. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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duty, not breach. If this is what the court means in Entrevia and Oster,
it would be better to separate out these concerns than to make the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement bear so much analytical respon-
sibility. An additional thorn that the presumption of knowledge raises
concerning administrative costs is the rent seeking plaintiff.
2. Rent Seeking
As I mentioned earlier, courts have long recognized that adminis-
trative concerns might dictate no duty rules, resulting in no recovery.
Historically, in certain types of cases, courts have stated that admin-
istrative concerns justified denying recovery to certain classes of plain-
tiffs. For instance, infliction of emotional distress, either intentiona '46
or negligent,' 47 was long characterized by no duty rules. For years, courts
refused to allow recovery for intentionally or negligently inflicted mental
distress because they were concerned that allowing recovery would open
the floodgates of litigation. That is, courts would be forced to hear
many, many cases involving emotional distress claims.Iu Of equal weight,
courts were worried that if they did not categorically deny recovery,
many of the filed cases would not involve bona fide emotional distress
claims. Thus courts would be forced to separate bona fide from fraud-
ulent claims. 49 Concomitantly, in the bona fide cases, courts would
need to "value" the freedom from disruption of mental or emotional
tranquility. Fearing this administrative burden, courts for many years
simply refused recovery. Courts dealt with the issue categorically by
denying recovery rather than on a case-by-case basis. What justified the
refusal of recovery even to those who admittedly suffered severe emo-
tional distress was the administrative costs that a contrary rule would
entail.
The economic harm rule,5 0 the rule that one may not recover for
negligently caused economic harm absent personal injury or property
damage, is also justified by administrative concerns. Allowing recovery
for economic loss would force courts to distinguish between bona fide
claims and spurious claims. Likewise, recognizing a duty would force
courts to determine whether markets had already taken account of the
possibility of the economic loss involved at trial. In such cases the
plaintiff would have already been compensated for the risk or loss
146. See generally State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240
P.2d 282 (1952).
147. See generally LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
148. See generally Daley v. Lacroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970).
149. See Prosser, Wade & Schwartz, supra note 51, at 396 n.l.
150. I borrow the phrase "economic harm rule" from D. Laycock, Modern American
Remedies 23 (Supp. 1989).
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through market forces and their effect on price setting.' To avoid these
administrative costs, most courts simply rule that there is no duty to
protect against such economic harm.
The privity of contract bar in tort cases involving defective products
provides another example.' 2 Rather than decide, case-by-case, if a prod-
uct. was unreasonably dangerous to remote purchasers and what effect
upstream contracts might have on downstream liability, courts simply
deferred to a contract paradigm for decision making and denied recovery
absent privity. Courts commented on the unworkability of a contrary
rule, referring to all the cases that would be filed.'"
These are all instances where courts used administrative concerns to
justify no recovery rules. In each of them, courts refused recovery to
broad classes of people on administrative grounds even though some
within the class had bona fide claims. The high cost of separating those
bona fide claims on a case-by-case basis led to categorical "no duty"
rules. I have so far opined that strict liability in action may arguably
be supported by administrative factors-avoiding the cost of litigating
the knowledge issue. However, this rule has a pro-plaintiff posture. That
is, more plaintiffs would recover under this rule than under a traditional
negligence formula. Although reduction of administrative costs may in
the twenty-first century be a reason to extend liability, this increased
liability presents a deep, but not fatal, problem with the doctrine.
If the presumption of knowledge makes it easier for plaintiffs to
recover one might expect that more plaintiffs will pursue claims. Ar-
guably any plaintiff who would lose if he must prove knowledge but
win if he need not would sue and win under the truncated Hand formula
but would not sue, or at least not win, under the Hand formula.
Moreover, some who might even recover under a negligence regime still
might not sue in negligence because the cost of litigating knowledge is
too great. Such plaintiffs might sue under the truncated Hand formula
if it really reduces litigation costs. Thus the truncated Hand formula
may well lead to more recovery and more suits. Lower litigation costs
might even encourage those uncertain of recovery under the truncated
Hand formula to pursue recovery. The down side of all this is that this
pursuit of claims may offset, or eat up, any administrative savings which
the rule creates. That is, the savings in cheaper trials may be offset by
the cost of more trials. Rent seeking plaintiffs, those seeking to profit
by an extended liability rule, may eat up all the administrative gains.5 4
151. See Galligan, Augmented Awards, supra note 108, at 72-73.
152. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
153. Id. (Alderson, J., concurring).
154. See, Galligan, Augmented Awards, supra note 108, at 72-73.
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This, in effect, is one of the problems with pro-plaintiff administrative
savings devices.
Aside from political bias it may help to explain the prevalence of
rules based on -administrative convenience that favor defendants. De-
termining if administrative savings are offset by rent seeking is an
empirical matter; however, it is an empirical matter of great concern.
For, if reducing the cost of trials makes it easier for plaintiffs to recover,
thus reducing administrative costs, which in turn leads to more plaintiffs
suing, then the savings in administrative costs of presuming knowledge
may be offset by the increased cost of more trials. Of course, we may
conclude that the increased cost is worth it because we are compensating
more, we are spreading risk better, and it seems fairer. Those are not
administrative considerations. This is an impossible state of affairs to
resolve without more knowledge than we now have. One might argue
that there are really not more cases filed under the truncated Hand
formula than under the Hand formula because plaintiffs would still
bring cases to trial albeit as negligence cases. Again one has no answers
until the empirical work is done. Even then I suspect a dearth of value-
free solutions.
3. Cumulating Claims
Another question that may arise is whether or not the presumption
of knowledge in itself really does save costs on those cases where it
applies. If plaintiffs usually combine negligence claims with strict liability
claims then parties will still do discovery and present evidence on the
knowledge issue, even though they are bringing strict liability claims.
That is, if the plaintiff decides to overkill by litigating both a negligence
claim and a strict liability claim, then any administrative savings under
the truncated Hand formula would be offset by the costs of trying to
prove knowledge under the Hand formula. Empirically, we need to know
if plaintiffs with strict liability cases continue to file negligence claims
too. More importantly we need to know whether, even if plaintiffs file
such claims, they take them seriously or just ignore the negligence claim
and pursue the strict liability claim alone. Economically, a lawyer with
a contingency fee arrangement has little incentive to needlessly pursue
the knowledge issue unless, of course, juries who find negligence return
higher verdicts, or a higher allocation of fault to defendants, as opposed
to juries who find strict liability under a truncated Hand formula. Of
course, higher recoveries in negligence cases would be contrary to our
supposed abhorrence of punitive damages in Louisiana. If damages are
compensatory they ought to be the same no matter how the plaintiff
got hurt. The allocation of fault issue is more involved."'
155. The allocation of fault issue is more involved because it forces an analysis of
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One potential way to solve the cumulated claim problem without
doing the empirical work would be to simply do away with the negligence
cause of action in any case where a presumption of knowledge (strict
liability) is available. This is, in essence, what the Louisiana legislature
did with the passage of the Louisiana Products Liability Act. In setting
forth exclusive theories of recovery against a product manufacturer, the
legislature did away with the plaintiff's general negligence cause of action
in a products liability case. Thus, in a Louisiana products case the
personal injury plaintiff may only utilize the Act and may not pursue
a general negligence claim.
IV. RECONNOITERING
Now would be a good time to do a little backtracking and explaining.
From my perspective, the administrative convenience of a rule presuming
knowledge provides the most promise for an explanation of the truncated
Hand formula. As always, there are problems. Although the truncated
Hand formula might lead to an over-investment in knowledge, would
not the rational producer/custodian stop investing in knowledge when
it appeared B - BK + Investments in knowledge was approaching P x
L and instead pay the judgment? And, would not that same producer/
custodian have to invest in knowledge under the Hand formula at least
up to the same point because until she made that investment she would
not know if B < P x L, or not? The difference of course is that under
the typical negligence Hand formula the producer/custodian does not
pay if B > P x L. Under the truncated Hand formula a defendant
may pay even if B > P x L; however, this would occur only if B -
BK < P x L.
Likewise, the presumption of knowledge will not lead to adminis-
trative savings if plaintiffs continue to press their negligence claims with
strict liability claims. Finally, even if the truncated Hand formula does
lead to administrative savings, rent seeking may consume them. Thus
the conduct of a plaintiff who is blameworthy vis-a-vis the defendant who, if strictly
liable, is not blameworthy in the traditional sense of the word. Louisiana courts have
wrestled with this problem. In one case the supreme court suggested that the courts
compare causation. Howard v. All State Ins. Co., 520 So. 2d 715 (La. 1988). In Dobson
v. Louisiana Power and Light, 567 So. 2d 569 (La. 1990), Justice Dennis suggested that
in a comparative negligence case the court should employ the Learned Hand formula. If
the court is serious about the truncated Learned Hand formula, then in a case with a
contributorily negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable defendant, the court would compare
the plaintiff's B (burden of avoiding the accident) with the defendant's B - BK (burden
of avoiding minus the cost of discovery). The party with the lowest figure ought to bear
a higher share of the fault as it was cheaper for her to avoid the accident. As noted,
this all assumes that the court takes the presumption of knowledge seriously as a matter
of policy.
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the administrative savings argument, while promising, is still a rocky
road. One way to deal with that rocky road is to maintain the flexibility
to sidestep the truncated Hand formula in appropriate cases. Louisiana
may have done this. The problem here is to not let the costs of flexibility
eat up the administrative savings a presumption of knowledge provides.
Still I am not so blind as to say that courts or legislatures are consciously
focusing on the administrative convenience argument. I feel there still
is the potential for an explanation here, but it must be examined in
light of some of the other purposes of tort law that seemed to lack
promise earlier.
First, the truncated Hand formula arguably does lead to more re-
coveries. While this seems a blessing from a compensation perspective,
it is part of its curse as a cost savings rule. As noted, providing
compensatiob does not require a risk/utility balance. But, if we can
alter the risk/utility balance a little, we can compensate more without
abandoning negligence altogether. This has morality and deterrence im-
plications as well. Recall that I set forth two competing moral arguments.
One supported. a type of absolute liability: between two innocents the
one who benefits from a product or thing and is in the best position
to guard against risk ought to pay. The other argument supported
negligence: a person ought to pay only when they are somehow blame-
worthy. Note how the truncated Hand formula supports both while
arguably saving money. It only imposes liability when risk is greater
than utility minus knowledge. That is, the truncated Hand formula
imposes liability where, in that favorite concept of negligence fans, there
is an unreasonable risk of harm. Alternatively, the truncated Hand
formula moves toward the first maxim by imposing liability on producers
of unreasonably dangerous products and custodians of unreasonably
dangerous things even where they have no knowledge of the risk. It
plays both sides of the fence.
Concomitantly, the deterrence debate rages but it rages largely on
a theoretical level, for no court has adopted a scheme of strict liability
as "pure" as Calabresi's. The truncated Hand formula again walks the
middle ground. It does not purport to impose absolute liability or even
"cheapest cost avoider" liability. It pays heed to those who fear that
absolute liability or "pure" strict liability would over deter. But, at the
same time, it does not allow defendants to escape liability by claiming
they did not know of a risk. By assuming knowledge, the truncated
Hand formula disposes with case-by-case analysis on the knowledge issue
(but not the risk/utility balance) and relies on a categorical rule to
encourage investments in knowledge, research, and development, which
Calabresi's approach would do across the board.
One may simultaneously note that the truncated Learned Hand
formula reaches a compromise between traditional case-by-case negligence
decision making and categorical liability rules. While the case-by-case
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aspect continues in the risk/utility balance, there is a categorical rule
about knowledge.
As for risk spreading, courts now generally only impose strict liability
in action on superior risk spreaders such as: manufacturers, businesses,
and even homeowners. While risk spreading concerns alone might ignore
risk and utility, a slight alteration of the negligence formula has furthered
risk spreading goals without bowing to them. \\
Thus, when all of the purposes of tort law, administrative conven-
ience, morality, deterrence, compensation, and risk spreading are con-
sidered together, the truncated Hand formula begins to make some
theoretical and practical sense. One last point that merits consideration
is behavioral-the nature of courts.
Judges are conservative as a group, not necessarily politically, but
institutionally. They are not eager to change rules. They pay attention
to precedent. They pay attention to superior courts' decisions. They
listen to scholars who argue that absolute liability would shut down
industry. On the other hand, they also listen to those who tell them
heightened liability rules against certain defendants may increase product
safety. They also pay attention to the facts of cases and their natural
human tendencies. They are compassionate. Compassion, I feel, provides
a push towards liability in difficult cases. Given all these competing
factors, rules usually change slowly.
"As such, one could imagine how a judge faced with conflicting
arguments about absolute liability, Calabresi type strict liability, and
negligence might pick a middle ground. It may well be best for our
modern day Solomons to split these rules in half-and then put them
back together. Halfway points are not always best, but they often appeal
to our sense of fairness. The truncated Hand formula is an illustration
of a halfway rule. It sounds and looks a lot like negligence in that it
retains the risk/utility test. But, it cuts out half of the traditional
negligence formula: knowledge. By retaining the risk/utility balance,
courts keep familiar doctrine and appeal to defense interests. By pre-
suming knowledge, courts increase compensation, spread risk, and half-
way accept Calabresi's deterrence arguments. Thus, this approach appeals
to both plaintiffs and their lawyers. And, the formula does all this while
arguably saving money. The rule allows the courts, like Mickey Mantle,
to hit from both sides of the plate.
Is the truncated Hand formula a step in an evolutionary (cyclical(?))
process toward absolute liability? Is it an aberration in our negligence/
fault regime? I am not sure; only time will tell. Recent developments
predict a negative answer to the first question for now. Is it an enduring
middle ground approach? Is it a rule that fosters administrative con-
venience? Or, is it a rule of judicial convenience and self-preservation?
Perhaps it is both of these last two things. Whatever, the truncated
Hand formula is what we have; it is. strict liability in action.
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper has posited that strict liability, as it exists and not as
it is theoretically articulated, is simply negligence with knowledge of the
risk presumed. Like the old hag Niall kissed, strict liability is not what
it may at first seem-what our initial impressions tell us. As such, strict
liability presents us with a truncated Learned Hand formula. One is
strictly liable not when B < P x L (negligence), but when B - BK <
P x L. The questions this formula raises are many. Answers are few.
Administrative convenience provides some solutions but leaves other
questions unanswered. The other purposes of tort law are ambiguous
on this point. However, only when all purposes of torts are considered
together, and when the lawyer reminds herself of the conservative nature
of courts, does a glimmer of explanation appear. Only then do we begin
to see just why we have it.
After witnessing the hag's transformation, Niall, future King of
Tara, recognized that what at first seems ugly and brutal may reveal a
more attractive side. As Royal Rule counselled him, "without fierce
conflict [Royal Rule] . . .may not be won. ' ' 56 Awareness of this idea
enlightens. Likewise, awareness of the nature of strict liability in action
enlightens us as to why we have it; and, it may enlighten our view of
torts in general.
156. J. Campbell, supra note I, at 118.
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